“Poetic Dwelling on the Earth as a Mortal” by James C. Edwards
Citation
Edwards, James C. “Poetic Dwelling on the Earth as a Mortal.” The Plain Sense of Things: The Fate of Religion in an Age of Normal Nihilism, by James C. Edwards, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, pp. 151–94.
Quotes
- species:
- themes:
Collations
Dasein as Zeug
Even Dasein itself is, proximally and for the most part, a kind of Zeug
Dasein as will power
Dasein too is—is only—will to power: a set of linguistic and behavioral practices both older than anything distinctively "mine" and always already devoted to their own preservation and enhancement; a will to power utterly without centralized self-consciousness or genuine personality. No wonder we are diminished by such self-knowledge.
Heidegger's second attempt to be post-Cartesian
Without reverting either to Idealism or to transcendental ego-subjectivity, Heidegger wants to find an account of being human that, as he says, lets things be.
his later work too is devoted to revealing a particular and "more primordial" way of understanding what it means to be a human being: he wants to uncover what it means to dwell poetically on the earth as a mortal.
the kind of life that escapes (so he believes) the dangers consequent upon our normal nihilism.
Four essays of Heidegger developing poetic dwelling on earth as a mortal
- "Building Dwelling Thinking"
- "The Thing"
- "'... Poetically Man Dwells...'"
- "The Question Concerning Technology
Philosophical subjectivity and objectivity come together
An understanding of the self and an understanding of the self's world are always given together.
philosophical subjectivity and philosophical objectivity are notions precisely made for one another.
the account of Dasein and the account of Dasein's world are correlative
Pragmata
part of the burden of Being and Time was to give an account of Dasein's world as a world of things, where things were understood not as the Cartesian res but as Greek pragmata.
pragmata—that is to say, that which one has to do in one's concernful dealings (praxis)
The Greeks thought little of pragmata
the Greeks left the character of such things essentially unthought
'mere Things'
Pragmata later became res
This essentially thoughtless understanding of the thing was taken up into the Latin res and eventually became the representational object set over against the transcendental ego-subject of Cartesianism.
Per Heidegger's Being and Time, the Being of a thing is always already holistic
Things are the things they are only in terms of a set of back-and-forth references to lots of other things, things that also depend upon such references for their Being.
to understand the Being of any one of these things is necessarily to understand the Being of some indefinite number of the others.
Per Heidegger's Being and Time, things are equipment
the network of things is a network of praxis
Thus things are, as Heidegger famously put it, equipment: das Zeug, "gear" to be used in the various projects of Dasein.
If particular things are granted their Being as particular things by their holistic reference to other particular things, then it is the various projects of Dasein that provide the context
within which those back-and-forth references between things are possible
Dasein
understood always and only as the "they-self," as self-elaborating social practices "all the way down"
Zeug's Being and significance is derived from Dasein
For things understood as Zeug, Dasein
is the condition of their Being, of their sense, of their significance as the things they are.
In Being and Time, Heidegger reduced all of Nature to Zeug
in a notorious passage in Being and Time Heidegger seems to reduce all of "Nature" to equipment for Dasein
When things become Zeug, Dasein saps them of their Pathos
and this sense of their being conditioned by Dasein's needs and purposes saps some (though not, of course, all) of their Pathos.
In the "pragmatic" account of them in Being and Time, things are devaluated, stripped of some of their customary pathos, as is the life within which those things have their original Being.
Technology
even in its deft evasion of Cartesianism, Being and Time remains unaware (according to Heidegger) of its captivity to something more insidious, something older and more powerful, something of which Cartesianism was—for all its genius—only a particular and incomplete expression.
It is this older and craftier understanding of things that condemns even the Dasein of Being and Time to the destiny of normal nihilism as foretold by Nietzsche
it is this understanding of things that Heidegger is trying to replace in the later work.
die Technik
It is technology that stands in the way of our full "poetic dwelling on the earth as mortals."
Instrumental and anthropological definition of technology
machines and tools powered by nonhuman sources of energy, to attain and further human interests.
are just the most obvious instances of the Being of all (or at least almost all) our things as they are constituted by our most basic social practices
Heidegger's "truer" definition of technology
technology is itself a way of revealing things, a way of letting something come to presence
the world of technology we all inhabit is distinguished by the particular way in which in that world things are revealed as the kind of things they are
It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth
Technology bring things into presence—lets them be seen—in a particular way; it reveals them as having a particular character, a particular Being
Truth per Heidegger
truth is not fundamentally the correspondence of some representation with the reality it represents
truth is the coming into presence of something in such a way that it can be seen for what it is.
Truth is dis-closure, un-covering, un-concealment.
Technology is truth
technology belongs to the realm of aletheia; it is, one might say, a kind of truth
Technology is now the fundamental way things gain Being
it is now the fundamental way—in which the world of human beings is constituted and populated; it is an overarching set of linguistic and behavioral practices that allow our things to appear around us in a particular way, that give to the things that appear in our world a particular Being
Heidegger's description of the modern technological Being of things
The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. Such challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is in turn distributed, and what is distributed is switching about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing
Bestand
Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand]
designates nothing less than the way in which everything presences that is wrought upon by the challenging revealing. Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as object.
that which in an orderly way awaits our use of it for the further ordering of things
For us (almost) everything reveals itself as Bestand.
are supposed to "disappear" into our use of them; they are supposed to be there for us only insofar as they are useful without impediment and without our careful scrutiny.
anonymous and interchangeable; they have no reality for us as particular things.
that's what makes them what they are.
The anonymous interchangeability is what makes all these things the kind of thing they are; that's what gives them their Being as Bestand.
Their nature, one might say, is to have only a general nature, as nature exhausted by their impersonal usefulness to us.
All these things suppress their reality as particular things.
all these things are things the Being of which covers over the manifold conditions of their coming to presence.
How we realize the Bestand of things
Most of the time, of course, we are not explicitly aware that our things have that sort of Being.
Our consciousness of them as "standing-reserve" shows itself not in anything we say or think about them; rather, it shows itself in how we comport ourselves to them in unself-conscious everyday action and reaction.
In all these unreflective ways (and others) I show what these things are for me: "standing-reserve."
How technology makes things Bestand
The appearance of things as Bestand is the inevitable result of those social practices that have as their nature and point what Heidegger calls ordering.
technology is a "challenging-forth"
"that challenging gathers man into ordering. This gathering concentrates man on ordering the real into standing-reserve."
What is this ordering? The dominant social practices constituting our world are practices that "enframe"
they are practices that put things in their proper places in such a way that they are readily available to be put to use by us with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of attention to the conditions of their appearing.
Such practices impose a "grid" (Gestell, frame) upon things so that within that grid-within the completely and immediately surveyable space created by that grid-those things are completely and immediately locatable and thus are completely and immediately available
They are located within a frame that transparently orients us to them and them to us; as a result of that perspicuous orientation within the frame they are ours to use and reuse easily and quickly and essentially thoughtlessly.
And the point of our use of our orderly things is further ordering. Under the spell of technology, we come to order things primarily for the sake of ordering itself.
CONTINUE AT PAGE 160 PAR. 2
Literature notes
What is Being and Time?
- Heidegger’s book published in 1927, which marks his greatest earlier work.
- Per Edwards, this book offers an escape from transcendental subjectivity.
What is the Western philosophical tradition of transcendental subjectivity?
- the lineage of thought that treats the human subject as an abstract, autonomous, foundational structure that grounds the possibility of knowledge, meaning, and experience — a subject that transcends concrete, everyday life.
- this tradition treats the subject not as a concrete, historically situated person, but as a kind of abstract structure
- It is “transcendental” because it is thought to transcend (i.e., sit behind or beneath) any actual, lived human experience, functioning instead as its necessary condition.
- This is the lineage of Descartes → Kant → Husserl → certain interpretations of Heidegger → much of analytic philosophy of mind → and even parts of post-Kantian phenomenology.
What is the difference between the discarnate self and the rugged self?
- discarnate self = the self produced by the Western tradition of transcendental subjectivity.
- rugged self = the everyday, common-sense self
Per Edwards, Heidegger recognized that Being and Time's philosophical reflection diminished Pathos of Dasein's world and life. So from mid-1930s onwards, he searched for a way to continue to critique transcendental subjectivity without diminishing Pathos.
Why did Heidegger struggle to give an account of human being that doesn't identify us as res cogitans?
- Heidegger wants to free us from the picture of the human being as a thinking substance, but the reflective, analytic posture required to articulate the structures of Dasein forces him back into a quasi-Cartesian conception—one that still looks like an inner subject surveying the grounds of its world.
What was Heidegger's critique against Descartes res cogitans?
- Dasein is being-in-the-world.
- The world is not a collection of objects; it is a meaningful context of involvement.
- Heidegger tries to defeat the Cartesian dualism of subject vs. object.
What is Dasein?
- Dasein is being.
- Dasein is being-in-the-world.
- Dasein is always in a place.
- Dasein is always interacting with others and other things.
- Dasein is always participating in something.
- Dasein "comports itself" (how it behaves right).
- All of Dasein's actions comes from comporting itself—from its way of existing in the world.
- Dasein has a responsibility in how it acts. Everything around it touches it.
- Dasein lives in a world that has significance.
- For life to be meaningful it has to have social significance.
- You don't see a chalk as powder lumped together. You see it immediately as something you can use to write. Because you see things as either being useful to you or not useful to you.
- You experience the world based on what you are doing and you do this without thinking.
Why did Edwards claim that Heidegger impersonates Nietzsche?
- Per Edwards, Heidegger ridicules Descartes in Being and Time but impersonates Nietzsche by arguing that the things in Dasein's world are products of Dasein's will to power.
- Per Heidegger in Being and Time, an equipment derives meaning from Dasein's activities.
- Edwards argue that this argument reduces things into Dasein's things.
- Nietzsche believes that meaning flows from human beings.
What is the idea behind "the plain sense of things"?
- The world has a reality not dependent on our projection or interpretation.
What is Dasein's will to power?
- Dasein's attempt to preserve and enhance itself within the life into which it has been thrown.
Per Edwards, in Being and Time, Heidegger interprets things as Zeug or "gear" that are significant only relative to Dasein's projects.
Why is Edwards claiming that Dasein is will to power?
- Heidegger describes Dasein not as a thinking subject, nor as a soul or personality, but as a site where preexisting structures of practice, language, and interpretation circulate.
- In Being and Time, the “self” of Dasein is: not the “I” of Cartesian consciousness, dispersed in das Man (the “they”), without an inner essence.
- This gives Dasein a structure remarkably close, in Edwards’ view, to Nietzsche’s “will to power without a subject”: dynamic, impersonal, without a metaphysical core
What is "will to power" per Nietzsche?
- Doctrine that everything pursues the expansion of their power.
What is existential phenomenology?
Bestand hides their context
Per Edwards, Bestand are things wherein which their Being as standing-reserve hides the conditions, complex processes, and larger context where they've emerged. Because these things become anonymous and interchangeable under a technological framework, their history and path to being become hidden.
Things are the number victims of these, but so are animals, plants, and even human beings. We become faceless and without because we've become Bestand.
A good religious and literary life should go against this tendency. Celebrate ordinary objects. Give a face to one's life and the life of many others.
This relates to insights on draft. New Criticism favors the made and finished. It doesn't want to know the act of getting there, which only drafts could elucidate.
Being fed a poem without us knowing its context of creation is like being fed a pork recipe without us seeing how the pig was killed and butchered.
Prompts
Heidegger's book published in 1927, which marks his greatest earlier work. :: Being and Time
Two main points of the Western philosophical tradition of transcendental subjectivity.
1.
2. The human subject transcends concrete, everyday life.
?
The human subject grounds knowledge, meaning, and experience.
Two main points of the Western philosophical tradition of transcendental subjectivity.
- The human subject grounds knowledge, meaning, and experience.
?
The human subject transcends concrete, everyday life.
Two main points of the Western philosophical tradition of transcendental subjectivity.
?
- The human subject grounds knowledge, meaning, and experience.
- The human subject transcends concrete, everyday life.
Dasein literally means being-in-the-world.
Per Edwards, what is the relationship between Dasein and its world? :: Dasein is the person and its things, including social practices.
Per Edwards, what is the difference between the discarnate self and the rugged self? :: Discarnate self = self of transcendental subjectivity; Rugged self = the everyday, common-sense self
Per Edwards, what is the relationship of Dasein with the discarnate self and the rugged self? :: It is neither these two.
Why is Dasein not the rugged self? :: It is not defined by identities.
Per Edwards, Heidegger’s Dasein is still recognizably us in what crucial respect? :: It remains subject to normal nihilism.
Per Edwards, what is Pathos? :: The human felt gravity of everyday practices.
The pathos of practice translates to the pathos of lives.
Per Edwards, what happens to the pathos of everyday practices and lives when they are subject to Dasein's philosophical reflection? :: Diminished
Per Edwards, why is the pathos of everyday practices and lives diminished when subject to Dasein's philosophical reflection? :: The reflection creates detachment from ordinary life.
Res cogitans mean thinking substance.
Why did Edwards claim that Heidegger impersonates Nietzsche in Being and Time? :: Nietzsche: Meaning flows from human beings / Heidegger: Things derive their meaning from Dasein's projects.
German word that means gear. :: Zeug
What is "will to power" per Nietzsche? :: Doctrine that everything pursues the expansion of their power.
Why is Edwards claiming that Dasein is will to power? :: It also seeks to preserve and enhance itself.
Four essays of Heidegger developing poetic dwelling on earth as a mortal
1.
2. "The Thing"
3. "'... Poetically Man Dwells...'"
4. "The Question Concerning Technology"
?
"Building Dwelling Thinking"
Four essays of Heidegger developing poetic dwelling on earth as a mortal.
- "Building Dwelling Thinking"
- "'... Poetically Man Dwells...'"
- "The Question Concerning Technology"
?
"The Thing"
Four essays of Heidegger developing poetic dwelling on earth as a mortal.
- "Building Dwelling Thinking"
- "The Thing"
- "The Question Concerning Technology"
?
"'... Poetically Man Dwells...'"
Four essays of Heidegger developing poetic dwelling on earth as a mortal.
- "Building Dwelling Thinking"
- "The Thing"
- "'... Poetically Man Dwells...'"
?
"The Question Concerning Technology"
Four essays of Heidegger developing poetic dwelling on earth as a mortal.
?
- "Building Dwelling Thinking"
- "The Thing"
- "'... Poetically Man Dwells...'"
- "The Question Concerning Technology"
In Heidegger's Being and Time, things are not understood as the Cartesian res but as Greek pragmata.
The Greek pragmata means things used for a person's projects.
Per Edwards, the Greek pragmata later became the Latin res.
Per Heidegger's Being and Time, how is the Being of a thing always already holistic? :: Things gain their Being through back-and-forth references to other things.
Per Heidegger's Being and Time, what provides the context within which a thing gains its Being through back-and-forth with other things? :: The various projects of Dasein.
What is the condition of the Being of things understood as Zeug? :: Dasein
Main argument of George Berkeley's idealism. :: The very existence of things depends on being perceived by a mind.
Formula that summarizes George Berkeley's idealism. :: To be is to be perceived.
Differentiate existence and Being. :: Existence is physical presence, while Being is the significance of things.
What is the Cartesian res? :: The external object represented by the ego-subject
When things become Zeug, what happens to their Pathos? :: Diminished
When things diminish their Pathos by being Zeug, what happens to the Dasein that gave them their original Being? :: Its Pathos is also diminished.
What condemns Dasein to the destiny of normal nihilism? :: Technology
Compare the age and power of Cartesianism and Technology, per Edwards. :: Technology is older and more powerful than Cartesianism
Greek word for truth. :: aletheia
Aside from truth, aletheia is also translated as disclosure.
Give one example of Bestand and explain :: house, leaves, computer, etc.
To do
Get a better answer to the question what is Dasein?